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INTRODUCTION 
In the recent case of Salinas v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court was 
presented, for the first time, with the question of whether the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Self-Incrimination Clause allows the prosecution to admit a non-
testifying defendant’s silence during pre-arrest, pre-Miranda police questioning 
as substantive evidence of guilt at trial.1 There has been a division of authority 
over this question among the United States courts of appeals for a long period,2 
and the time was ripe for a definite ruling on the matter by the Court. 
                                                        
*  Professor of Law, College of Law and Business, Ramat Gan, Israel. 
**  Senior Lecturer, the College of Management School of Law, Rishon Le-Zion, Israel. 
The authors’ names are listed in alphabetical order. 
1  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013). 
2  Compare, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 944 F. 2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing 
the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt), with Combs v. 
Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest 
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However, the 5-4 plurality decision, authored by Justice Alito, avoided rul-
ing on this question and instead decided the case on a technicality. The Court 
held that the government was allowed to introduce petitioner’s silence in its 
case-in-chief because he had not explicitly invoked his rights under the Fifth 
Amendment. Thus, the question of whether the prosecutor and the judge may 
refer to a non-testifying defendant’s silence during a non-custodial police inter-
view as substantive evidence of guilt when the suspect does “plead the Fifth” 
remains unresolved. By so holding, not only did the Court refrain from resolv-
ing the broader constitutional question and the split among the lower courts, but 
it also significantly undermined the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-
incrimination. This holding weakened the amendment’s protection by, inter 
alia, failing to draw a distinction between witnesses, who are obliged to answer, 
and accused persons, who may refuse to respond and may challenge the prose-
cution’s case by silence. The Court’s narrow interpretation of the privilege also 
has significant implications for the conduct of investigations. It might lead to 
pre-arrest questioning becoming the norm and incentivize the manipulative de-
laying of Miranda warnings and custody until after the interrogation, thus 
largely obviating Fifth Amendment protections. 
The analysis of the Court’s decision and its implications raises two distinct 
questions. The first is whether the Fifth Amendment protects the right to si-
lence of an accused person who is not under arrest and who has not yet been 
read his Miranda rights, and if so, whether he may enjoy the right without its 
explicit invocation. The second question is whether admissibility of pre-arrest 
silence as evidence of guilt against a non-testifying defendant violates the privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination. This article argues that the answer to 
both questions should be in the affirmative. 
Permitting adverse inferences from silence carries a clear and unambiguous 
message of guilt. Leonard Levy, in his seminal book on the origins of the Fifth 
Amendment, notes that throughout seventeenth-century common law, “[t]here 
was not yet any recognition of the fact that refusal to answer an incriminating 
question did not imply guilt.”3 Without recognition of the conceptual develop-
ment that the criminal justice system has gone through since that period—from 
the notion that the accused must speak, to the notion that the prosecution must 
meet its burden of proof in order to obtain convictions—it is difficult to sustain 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 
In view of this conceptual development, this article argues that pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence should not be used as evidence of guilt, notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                                
silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against Self 
Incrimination). For a detailed overview of the conflicting decisions of the federal courts, see 
Christopher Macchiaroli, To Speak Or Not to Speak: Can Pre-Miranda Silence Be Used as 
Substantive Evidence of Guilt?, CHAMPION , Mar. 2009, at 14, 16–19. 
3  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 283 (1968). 
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the explicit invocation of the privilege or the lack thereof. This argument is 
built on two pillars, each of which is sufficient to sustain this conclusion. The 
first pillar refers to the status of a person as a suspect. Leveling accusations by 
law enforcement authorities against a person, even if she is not warned and is 
not held in custody, creates a situation of conflict. Accordingly, the state cannot 
resort to its adversary for assistance. In the face of accusations, a person may 
legitimately cut off any contact with his accusers. He should not be compelled 
to explain his decision and should have no duty to expressly invoke the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Rather, the privilege should be implied from the 
very status of being an accused. The second pillar refers to the burden of proof 
imposed upon the state. The state—through its law enforcement agencies—
bears the burden of proof throughout the criminal process, and it should take 
into account that the accused person may elect silence as a defense strategy. 
Choosing to remain silent either during police questioning or during the trial 
constitutes a statement that the emphasis should be placed on the prosecution’s 
evidence rather than on the defendant’s version. Such a statement is consistent 
with the above-mentioned historical development of the right to silence. 
Part I of this article presents a brief overview of the relevant areas of the 
Supreme Court’s silence jurisprudence and the rules regarding adverse trial in-
ferences drawn from pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. Part I also examines the 
facts of Salinas v. Texas and the Court’s holding there. Part II discusses the in-
vocation requirement, arguing that the Court’s proposed justifications for re-
quiring explicit invocation of the privilege are inapplicable to the factual situa-
tion presented in Salinas. This part also argues that in the face of accusations, 
when there is a conflict between the state and the individual, the privilege 
should be self-executing. Part III of the article focuses on the probative value of 
pretrial silence. It argues that silence does not indicate guilt and that allowing 
adverse inferences does not promote the truth-seeking purpose of the trial as 
their use is highly prejudicial. It further argues that considering silence as part 
of the prosecution’s evidence is inconsistent with the presumption of inno-
cence. Part IV discusses the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence and the implications of refusal to speak in the face of ac-
cusations. It argues that in light of the ambiguity of silence, and given that non-
custodial police questioning is not necessarily less coercive than custodial inter-
rogations, drawing adverse inferences from silence when a person is confronted 
with police questioning as a suspect is unconstitutional. Part V of the article 
discusses the historical shift from the “accused speaks” approach to the theory 
of “testing the prosecution,” and it analyzes the significance of the burden of 
proof in light of the complexity of choosing silence at the pretrial stage. It also 
considers the rationales for distinguishing between the use of silence for im-
peachment purposes and its use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, arguing that 
the latter is prohibited as the prosecution must meet the burden of proof by its 
own independent labors. Finally, the article concludes that drawing adverse in-
ferences from a suspect’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence against non-testifying 
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defendants violates the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, whether the sus-
pect affirmatively asserted the privilege or not. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S SILENCE JURISPRUDENCE: 
FROM MIRANDA TO SALINAS 
A. Pre-Salinas Holdings Regarding the Use of Pretrial Silence 
The plurality’s holding in Salinas avoided the question of whether pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence is admissible evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-
chief against a non-testifying defendant who asserted his privilege during a po-
lice interview. Until Salinas, the Court admitted a defendant’s pre-Miranda si-
lence only for impeachment purposes. There has been a split of authority be-
tween the lower courts regarding the question of whether adverse inferences 
from pre-Miranda silence can be drawn against non-testifying defendants as 
substantive proof of guilt.4 
As far as silence at trial is concerned, the prohibition on adverse inferences 
is clear. In Griffin v. California, the Court held that prosecutorial or judicial 
comment on the defendant’s failure to testify at trial as tending to prove guilt is 
prohibited since it violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.5 The Court later held, in Carter v. Kentucky, that a defendant, upon re-
quest, has a right to a judge’s instruction to the jury not to draw any adverse in-
ferences from his silence at trial.6 In Griffin, the Court did not specify the 
nature of the coercion embodied in directing the jury’s attention to the defend-
ant’s silence, but rather held that a comment on silence “is a penalty imposed 
by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege 
by making its assertion costly.”7 The holding in Griffin does not seem to be 
based on a concern for coercion to speak, but rather on the worry that a defend-
ant would be obliged to provide the prosecution incriminating evidence if he 
exercises the right not to testify.8 
The Court in Miranda held, albeit in dicta, that an accused person’s consti-
tutional right to remain silent implies that no weight would be attributed to her 
silence in evaluating the incriminating evidence brought against her.9 In Doyle 
                                                        
4  See supra note 2. 
5  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
6  Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303–05 (1981). 
7  Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. 
8  See Lisa Louise Savadjian, Student Scholarship, Silence Should Not Speak Louder than 
Words: The Use of Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence as Substantive Evidence of Guilt, SETON 
HALL LAW EREPOSITORY (May 1, 2013), http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship 
/299. 
9  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) (“In accord with our decision today, it 
is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at 
trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”). 
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v. Ohio, the Court explicitly held that commenting on a defendant’s pretrial si-
lence after she has been taken into custody and warned pursuant to Miranda for 
impeachment purposes is constitutionally forbidden.10 The Court explained this 
holding based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: 
Silence in the wake of [Miranda] warnings may be nothing more than the ar-
restee’s exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is in-
solubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person ar-
rested. Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express 
assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any 
person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be funda-
mentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s 
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.11 
The Court recognized one understandable exception: evidence of post-
Miranda silence is allowed to impeach the defendant’s testimony that contra-
dicts the very fact of silence.12 In Wainwright v. Greenfield, the Court reiterated 
the unfairness embodied in taking post-Miranda silence into account and barred 
the substantive use of post-warning custodial silence to prove guilt.13 Wain-
wright, Miranda, and Doyle are applicable only to the use at trial of an ac-
cused’s silence following a Mirandized custodial interrogation. The courts were 
thus left to determine whether adverse inferences could be drawn from a de-
fendant’s silence arising in two other pretrial scenarios: first, before custody 
and Miranda warnings; and second, after custody but before Miranda warn-
ings.14 However, the Court has addressed each of these scenarios only with re-
gard to the use of silence for impeachment purposes against testifying defend-
ants. 
In Jenkins v. Anderson, the defendant turned himself in two weeks after 
committing a murder; only at trial did the defendant claim that he acted in self-
defense after being attacked.15 In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that 
the defendant’s failure to report the alleged attack cast doubt on his claim to 
have acted in self-defense. The Court held that the use of this unusual form of 
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant’s credibility did not 
violate either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.16 
                                                        
10  Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). 
11  Id. at 617–18 (footnote and citations omitted). 
12  Id. at 619 n.11. 
13  Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (disallowing the use of post-Miranda 
silence to rebut defendant’s claim of insanity). 
14  See Jan Martin Rybnicek, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t?: The Absence of a 
Constitutional Protection Prohibiting the Admission of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence, 19 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 405, 407 (2009). 
15  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 233 (1980). 
16  Id. at 238–39. While the majority emphasized the Due Process Clause, the concurrence of 
Justice Stevens rejected defendant’s claim on Fifth Amendment grounds. Id. at 241 (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
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The fact that Jenkins had not come forward to the police with his self-defense 
story was admitted in order to impeach his trial testimony.17 The Court empha-
sized that “the Constitution does not forbid ‘every government-imposed choice 
in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of consti-
tutional rights,’ ”18 and that impeachment through pre-arrest silence “may en-
hance the reliability of the criminal process.”19 In the absence of Miranda 
warnings, there is no breach of promise that silence will not be used against the 
defendant, and thus no unfairness exists.20 
In Fletcher v. Weir, the Court continued this line of reasoning. Applying 
Jenkins v. Anderson to silence following an arrest, it held that impeaching de-
fendants by their pretrial silence is constitutionally permissible if no Miranda 
warnings had been given.21 As in Jenkins, the defendant in Fletcher faced mur-
der charges for which he later provided an exculpatory account at trial. Accord-
ing to Fletcher, silence of a custodial suspect whose questioning had not yet 
begun may be used to undermine the credibility of his testimony at trial. In both 
Jenkins and Fletcher, the Court did not rule on the question of whether, or un-
der what circumstances, pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive evi-
dence of guilt against a non-testifying defendant.22 As the Court made clear, 
both of these cases presented significantly different circumstances from Doyle, 
because Doyle’s holding was mainly based “on the unfairness of explicitly rep-
resenting to a suspect that he has the right to silence and then penalizing the 
suspect for exercising that right.”23 Miranda warnings, regarded as embodying 
an implicit promise not to use a defendant’s silence against him, are therefore 
the watershed for the prosecution’s ability to impeach a testifying defendant’s 
credibility by his pretrial silence. It is far from clear, however, whether it fol-
lows that the Fifth Amendment’s right to remain silent should be triggered by 
Miranda warnings insofar as the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest silence as evi-
dence of guilt is concerned. Rather, it seems that a clear distinction should be 
drawn between these two doctrinal categories—the use of silence for the im-
peachment of a testifying defendant and the substantive use of silence against a 
                                                        
17  Id. at 233–34 (majority opinion). 
18  Id. at 236 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973)). 
19  Id. at 238. 
20  Id. at 239–40. 
21  Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam). 
22  Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2. 
23  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 266 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); see Fletcher, 455 
U.S. at 605–07; Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. 
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non-testifying defendant24—the latter situation requiring far greater protection 
than the former.25 
B. Salinas v. Texas: Facts and Opinion 
Prior to Salinas, the Court had not been faced with the question of whether 
pre-Miranda silence can be admitted as substantive evidence of guilt against a 
non-testifying defendant. The case of Salinas arose out of the December 1992 
homicide of two brothers at their home in Houston, Texas. An officer who ar-
rived at the scene located shotgun shell casings around the doorway of the 
brothers’ apartment.26 The police were informed that Genovevo Salinas had at-
tended a party at the apartment the night before the shooting.27 Consequently, 
police officers interviewed Salinas and his father at their residence.28 The offic-
ers told them that the interview was made in connection with a murder investi-
gation.29 Salinas and his father voluntarily answered the investigators’ ques-
tions and consented to a search of their residence.30 Salinas’s father also handed 
over his shotgun to the officers upon their request.31 Subsequently, Salinas vol-
untarily agreed to accompany the police officers to the stationhouse for an in-
terview.32 At the police station, during a noncustodial interview of nearly an 
hour, Salinas admitted that he knew the victims and that he had visited their 
residence several times, yet denied any disagreement with them.33 He answered 
all the questions and remained silent only at one point, when asked if the shot-
gun shells found at the scene would match the shells of his father’s shotgun.34 
After a few moments of silence, the police changed the subject and asked other 
questions that Salinas did answer. Following the interview, the interrogating 
officer arrested Salinas “on some outstanding traffic warrants.”35 However, the 
officer provided the following explanation at trial: “I had the opinion that he 
was being deceptive and lying to me and I wanted to hold on to him.”36 The 
                                                        
24  See Andrew J.M. Bentz, Note, The Original Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and 
Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 897, 922 (2012); see also United States v. Moore, 104 
F.3d 377, 385–86 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
25  See infra Part V; see also Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest 
Too Little: Reassessing the Probative Value of Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21, 35 
(2008). 
26  Salinas v. Texas, 368 S.W.3d 550, 552 (Tex. App. 2011). 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013). 
33  Salinas, 368 S.W.3d at 552. 
34  Id. at 552–53. 
35  Id. at 554. 
36  Id. 
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following day, a ballistics analysis identified a match between the casings from 
the murder scene and the shotgun owned by Salinas’s father.37 Salinas was 
charged only later, when a witness came forward and reported that Salinas had 
confessed to the murders.38 Salinas did not testify at trial, and the prosecutor 
referred to his silence during police questioning only in passing. The trial re-
sulted in a hung jury.39 On retrial, Salinas refrained once again from testifying 
and the prosecutors, despite the defense’s objection, were permitted to rely on 
his pre-arrest, pre-Miranda selective silence at closing arguments as evidence 
of his guilt, stating as follows: 
The police officer testified that [Salinas] wouldn’t answer that question. He 
didn’t want to answer that. . . . You know, if you asked somebody—there is a 
murder in New York City, is your gun going to match up the murder in New 
York City? Is your DNA going to be on that body or that person’s fingernails? Is 
[sic] your fingerprints going to be on that body? You are going to say no. An in-
nocent person is going to say: What are you talking about? I didn’t do that. I 
wasn’t there. He didn’t respond that way. He didn’t say: No, it’s not going to 
match up. It’s my shotgun. It’s been in our house. What are you talking about? 
He wouldn’t answer that question.40 
The jury found Salinas guilty of murder and sentenced him to twenty years 
in prison and a $5,000 fine.41 Salinas appealed the decision, and the Texas 
courts of appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the Fifth Amendment 
permitted the use of a non-testifying defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda si-
lence not only for impeachment purposes, but also as substantive evidence of 
guilt, stating that, “[a]bsent a showing of government compulsion, the Fifth 
Amendment simply has nothing to say on the admissibility of pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence in the State’s case-in-chief.”42 
On discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
conviction.43 The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that different courts had 
reached conflicting decisions, and that “[n]early all of the courts that have ad-
dressed this issue have noted the conspicuous split and the lack of guidance 
from the Supreme Court.”44 The United States Supreme Court granted certiora-
                                                        
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Sidney Rosdeitcher & Katriana Roh, Supreme Court Preview: The Right to Remain Silent, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis 
/supreme-court-preview-right-remain-silent. 
40  Salinas, 368 S.W.3d at 556. 
41  Id. at 554. 
42  Id. at 558. 
43  Salinas v. Texas, 369 S.W.3d 176, 177 (Tex, Crim. App. 2012). 
44  Id. at 178–79. On this split, see also David S. Romantz, “You Have the Right to Remain 
Silent”: A Case for the Use of Silence as Substantive Proof of the Criminal Defendant’s 
Guilt, 38 IND. L. REV. 1, 28–47 (2005). 
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ri to resolve the split of authority over the admissibility of pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence against non-testifying defendants.45 
The plurality opinion written by Justice Alito, and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Kennedy, held that standing mute is not equivalent to as-
serting the privilege and that “a witness who desires its protection must claim 
it.”46 Accordingly, since Salinas had not expressly invoked the privilege against 
self-incrimination when declining to respond during his police interview, he 
could not rely on the privilege to avoid inferences of guilt from his silence.47 
The Court distinguished the case before it from its prior rulings in Griffin48 and 
Miranda,49 in each of which it held that the privilege against self-incrimination 
forbids the prosecution from using a defendant’s silence during trial or custodi-
al questioning as substantive evidence of guilt. The Court in Salinas held that 
Griffin and Miranda were the exceptions to the general rule that a person must 
expressly assert the privilege as a necessary condition for enjoying it, that he 
should provide a reason for refusing to answer, and that he must be clear that 
his answer might lead to self-incrimination. Justice Thomas, faithful to his aspi-
ration to overrule the Griffin holding in the appropriate case,50 issued a concur-
rence joined by Justice Scalia, opining that since the holding in Griffin was er-
roneous, there was no reason to extend its reach to other situations.51 Justice 
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan. 
Absent a common ground for the decision, its value as a binding precedent 
is limited.52 However, as will be discussed below, the decision does affect the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Accordingly, this article now turns to the 
concerns created by the Court’s narrow interpretation of the right to silence and 
considers the implications of the invocation requirement on the question of 
whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence should be admitted as substantive evi-
dence of guilt. 
II. THE INVOCATION REQUIREMENT: REMAINING SILENT BY SPEAKING 
The plurality opinion of Justice Alito held that Salinas should have explic-
itly invoked the privilege in order to enjoy it,53 but the decision lacked a clear 
                                                        
45  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). 
46  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425, 427 (1984)). 
47  Id. at 2178. 
48  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
49  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
50  Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 343 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
51  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184. 
52  City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977). 
53  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
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ruling regarding the exact language that a suspect must use in order to invoke 
his Fifth Amendment rights during non-custodial police questioning.54 Moreo-
ver, in rejecting the argument that “the invocation requirement does not apply 
where a witness is silent in the face of official suspicions,”55 the Court failed to 
distinguish between a mere witness and a suspect facing accusations. Undoubt-
edly, “a witness does not [invoke the privilege] by simply standing mute.”56 
Whereas a mere witness has a duty to assist law enforcement agencies in seek-
ing the truth by providing information,57 a suspect bears no such obligation. 
The Court’s distinction between pre-arrest and post-arrest silence—as far 
as the conditions for enjoying the privilege are concerned—is equally unper-
suasive. The Court construed prior case law as establishing only two exceptions 
to the express invocation requirement. First, a criminal defendant need not take 
the stand and assert the privilege at his own trial. Second, a witness’s failure to 
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination must be excused where govern-
mental coercion makes his forfeiture of the privilege involuntary.58 The Court 
held that since Salinas’s interview with police was voluntary—as opposed to 
the interrogation of a custodial suspect—he could not benefit from the latter 
exception. However, as explained below, pre-arrest questioning may be as co-
ercive as post-arrest interrogation. Therefore, the proposition that a suspect 
should not be required to explicitly invoke the privilege due to the coercive na-
ture of the interrogation holds true to every conflict between the state and the 
individual in which the state levels criminal accusations towards the individual, 
whether pre- or post-custody.59 
Furthermore, the precedents that the plurality relied upon do not seem to 
substantiate its conclusion that non-custodial suspects must explicitly invoke 
the Fifth Amendment in order to enjoy it. The plurality’s ruling in this matter 
stands in contrast to the Court’s prior holding that “no ritualistic formula is 
necessary in order to invoke the privilege.”60 As the dissent asserted, 
“[c]ircumstances, not a defendant’s statement, tie the defendant’s silence to the 
right.”61 Whenever a reasonable person may infer that a suspect intended, by 
his silence, to exercise the privilege, there should be no need to require explicit 
                                                        
54  Id. at 2183; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Remaining Silent After Salinas, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. DIALOGUE 116, 121 (2013). 
55  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2181–82. 
56  Id. at 2178. 
57  See Comment, Pretrial Detention of Witnesses, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 700, 702–03 (1969); 
see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973) (“It is clear that a subpoena to ap-
pear before a grand jury is not a “seizure” in the Fourth Amendment sense, even though that 
summons may be inconvenient or burdensome”). 
58  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180. 
59  For a detailed discussion of the coercive nature of pre-custody questioning, see infra Part 
IV. 
60  See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955). 
61  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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reference to the Fifth Amendment. The plurality relied heavily on Roberts v. 
United States,62 Jenkins v. Anderson,63 and United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. 
Commissioner of Immigration,64 interpreting these cases as requiring the appli-
cation of the explicit invocation prerequisite to all instances of pre-arrest si-
lence. However, the aforementioned cases presented unique circumstances in 
which the defendants’ intentions were unclear, as none of the circumstances 
suggested reliance on the privilege, and in which it was particularly important 
for the state to know whether the defendants sought to rely on the Fifth 
Amendment.65 These precedents are therefore far removed from the facts of Sa-
linas. As the dissenting Justices aptly concluded: 
Salinas need not have expressly invoked the Fifth Amendment. The context was 
that of a criminal investigation. Police told Salinas that and made clear that he 
was a suspect. His interrogation took place at the police station. Salinas was not 
represented by counsel. The relevant question—about whether the shotgun from 
Salinas’ home would incriminate him—amounted to a switch in subject matter. 
And it was obvious that the new question sought to ferret out whether Salinas 
was guilty of murder.66 
The plurality, however, emphasized that “[a] suspect who stands mute has 
not done enough to put police on notice that he is relying on his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.”67 The Court reasoned that the requirement of expressly invok-
ing the privilege “ensures that the Government is put on notice when a witness 
intends to rely on the privilege so that it may either argue that the testimony 
sought could not be self-incriminating . . . or cure any potential self-
incrimination through grant of immunity.”68 However, this rationale applies on-
ly at the trial stage, as it is aimed at allowing the judge to make the necessary 
inquiries in order to determine whether reliance on the privilege was appropri-
ate to the facts.69 As the Court itself stated, “A witness’ constitutional right to 
refuse to answer questions depends on his reasons for doing so, and courts need 
to know those reasons to evaluate the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim.”70 
The Court’s proposed rationale for requiring explicit invocation of the privilege 
is therefore inapplicable to the interrogation stage. 
What, then, might be the rationale for requiring explicit invocation of the 
right to silence at the pretrial stage? In order to answer this question, one 
should explore the origins of the invocation requirement. The explicit invoca-
tion rule had originally been crafted solely for the purpose of the right to coun-
                                                        
62  Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980). 
63  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980). 
64  United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927). 
65  See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2188 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
66  Id. at 2189. 
67  Id. at 2182 (plurality opinion). 
68  Id. at 2179. 
69  See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 23. 
70  Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183. 
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sel rather than the right to remain silent.71 In Davis v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that a suspect’s Miranda right to counsel must be invoked 
“unambiguously.”72 If the accused refrains from invoking the right to counsel 
or if his statement is equivocal, the police are not required to cease the interro-
gation and may continue questioning him.73 In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the 
Court extended the explicit invocation requirement to the right to remain silent, 
holding that “there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for de-
termining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and 
the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.”74 The Court in Berghuis rea-
soned that both rights “protect the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination by requiring an interrogation to cease when either right is in-
voked.”75 In Berghuis, the defendant was in custody after being informed of his 
Miranda rights, and he was subsequently silent in the face of two hours and 
forty-five minutes of questioning before he made his inculpatory statements.76 
Defendant did not tell the police that he wished to remain silent. The Court held 
that the defendant’s silence did not constitute invocation of the privilege and 
thus did not trigger his right to cut off the questioning. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the defendant’s subsequent statements were admissible. 
Although Berghuis had nothing to do with a prosecutor’s right to comment 
on a defendant’s silence, the Salinas plurality held that “the logic of Berghuis 
applies with equal force”77 to the case at hand, thereby disregarding the ra-
tionale of the Berghuis rule as well as the context in which it was crafted. As 
the Court’s holdings in both Davis v. United States and Berghuis v. Thompkins 
indicate, the explicit invocation requirement was designed to provide police 
with clear guidance as to whether or not they should cease the interrogation. 
Otherwise, police would be required to make difficult decisions about an ac-
cused’s unclear intent and face the consequence of suppression if they guess 
wrong.78 
In light of the rule that police must cease further interrogation whenever 
the right to counsel or the right to remain silent is invoked,79 the unambiguous 
                                                        
71  See George M. Dery III, Do You Believe in Miranda? The Supreme Court Reveals Its 
Doubts in Berghuis v. Thompkins by Paradoxically Ruling That Suspects Can Only Invoke 
Their Right to Remain Silent by Speaking, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 407, 418 (2011). 
72  Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
73  Id. at 462. 
74  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (citing Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 
648 (1984)). 
75  Id. (citations omitted). 
76  Id. at 376. 
77  Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (2013). 
78  Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 461). 
79  See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–07 (1975) (holding that police may resume 
questioning after a suspect invoked his right to silence only if they scrupulously honored this 
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invocation requirement is understandable. However, there seems to be no com-
pelling reason to extend the requirement to the circumstances of Salinas, where 
a suspect remains silent in the face of accusations during police questioning and 
refrains from making an incriminating statement. The unambiguous invocation 
rule—as far as the right to silence is concerned—should be applicable only 
when the admissibility of an accused’s statement (preceded by silence) during 
police questioning is at issue at trial, not the admissibility of his silence. Salinas 
did not argue, and had no reason to argue, that police should have ceased the 
interrogation once he remained silent; nor did he argue that his statements were 
inadmissible. The policemen’s knowledge of Salinas’s reasons for remaining 
silent is simply irrelevant to the question of whether adverse inferences could 
be drawn against him at trial. As will be discussed below, one of the main rea-
sons for prohibiting the use of silence in the face of police questioning as evi-
dence of guilt is its ambiguity.80 Silence is no less ambiguous when the accused 
explicitly asserts the privilege against self-incrimination. 
If the Salinas plurality was of the view that even explicit invocation of the 
privilege is not a shield against the use of pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt, 
it could have avoided the lengthy discussion of the invocation requirement and 
could have simply held instead that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to pre-
arrest questioning. The Court’s detailed analysis of the invocation requirement 
and its significance suggests that had Salinas explicitly invoked his rights, the 
use of his silence as substantive evidence of guilt would have been prohibited. 
However, the Court’s logic and reasoning are far from clear as to why Salinas’s 
silence would not have been incriminating had he explicitly invoked his rights 
and why the applicability of the Fifth Amendment in such circumstances 
should be conditioned upon the manner of its invocation. It seems that the 
Court’s requirement of explicit invocation can only be explained by its wish to 
restrict and undermine the applicability of the privilege, based on the notion 
that silence is indicative of guilt, a notion which is implicit in the plurality’s 
holding. 
III. SILENCE IS NOT INDICATIVE OF GUILT 
Numerous scholars hold the view that silence in the face of accusations 
implies guilt because it indicates that the accused person has no explanation 
that is compatible with innocence.81 A reasonable innocent person would take 
the opportunity to exculpate herself.82 An accused’s silence in the face of accu-
                                                                                                                                
invocation by cutting off questioning, waited a reasonable amount of time, and informed the 
suspect of his or her Miranda rights once again). 
80  See infra Part III. 
81  Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on Adverse 
Inferences from Silence, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1005, 1049–50 (1989). 
82  Id. at 1029. 
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sations is therefore relevant evidence for the establishment of her guilt or inno-
cence.83 It is just a matter of common sense.84 
Silence clearly passes the test of relevancy; the probability that silence in-
dicates guilt is higher than the probability that it indicates innocence.85 This is 
because the guilty suspect has an additional reason to remain silent: his inabil-
ity to provide a true story that would exculpate him and his willingness to con-
ceal the truth.86 Bentham’s remarks on this matter have become canonic: “If all 
the criminals of every class had assembled, and framed a system after their own 
wishes, is not this rule the very first which they would have established for 
their security?”87 Innocence heightens our expectations of getting a response. 
The innocent person has motives to speak that the guilty lacks—his indignation 
at being falsely accused, and his willingness to reveal the truth.88 
Some argue that silence is not different from other aspects of conduct, such 
as fleeing from the crime scene, that are routinely considered as evidence of 
guilt.89 Therefore, the possibility to draw inferences from the conduct of failure 
to speak should not be regarded as a compulsion or penalty.90 At any rate, since 
the test for the admission of evidence is relevance rather than conclusiveness, 
the fact that silence does not inexorably lead to the conclusion of guilt and 
might be consistent with innocence does not render silence irrelevant.91 
Various scholars assume that silence in the face of substantial incriminat-
ing evidence is especially suspicious.92 Moreover, in cases of selective silence, 
or the refusal to answer only particular questions, as in Salinas, drawing ad-
verse inferences from silence is prima facie consistent with common sense. 
It may be claimed that, from a normative point of view, silence should be 
discouraged. The criminal justice system has no interest to spur accused per-
sons to remain silent. The opposite is true. Cooperation is the behavior that 
should be encouraged. Testimony promotes the search for truth,93 whereas si-
lence does not. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that confessions dur-
ing interrogations are “essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, 
                                                        
83  LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 152 (2006); Office of Legal Policy, 
supra note 81, at 1007. 
84  Office of Legal Policy, supra note 81, at 1011.  
85  Id. at 1074.  
86  Id. at 1074, 1101. 
87  JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (M. Dumont ed., 1825). 
88  Office of Legal Policy, supra note 81, at 1101. 
89  Id. at 1061–62 (relating to silence at trial or before trial); Stefanie Petrucci, Comment, 
The Sound of Silence: The Constitutionality of the Prosecution’s Use of Prearrest Silence in 
Its Case-in-Chief, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 449, 483–84 (2000) (regarding pre-arrest silence). 
90  Office of Legal Policy, supra note 81, at 1078. 
91  Id. at 1073. 
92  Id. at 1074. 
93  Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1330–34 (2009). 
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convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.”94 Likewise, some schol-
ars opine that “[i]t is difficult to perceive any legitimate criminal justice or so-
cietal interest that is served when a defendant declines to testify at trial.”95 
In opposition to this view, in United States v. Hale the Supreme Court 
viewed pre-arrest silence as having no significant probative value and as preju-
dicial evidence.96 The Court held that “[i]n most circumstances silence is so 
ambiguous that it is of little probative force.”97 Its prejudicial effect is so signif-
icant that it is unlikely to be expelled by the defendant’s explanations as to the 
reasons for not telling his story to police officers.98 Pretrial silence should be 
excluded as evidence because its prejudicial effect to the defendant outweighs 
its probative value. 
According to this perception, silence is simply indicative of nothing: “Mere 
silence . . . does not necessarily make it more probable than not that the defend-
ant is attempting to hide something, or is guilty.”99 The exercise of the privilege 
against self-incrimination is not probative of guilt.100 The concept that silence 
indicates guilt may simply mislead. When Goneril and Regan testify to their 
enormous love for their father, King Lear, they simply lie. When Cordelia de-
clares that she can say nothing about her love for her father, it does not mean 
that she does not truly love him.101 
In light of silence’s insoluble ambiguity, “allowing in pretrial silence does 
not promote truth seeking, it promotes confusion and misjudgment.”102 Addi-
tionally, there are normative considerations militating against the admission of 
silence. Thus, as the Court stated in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, “[w]e have al-
ready rejected the notion that citizens may be forced to incriminate themselves 
because it serves a governmental need.”103 
Some scholars argue that “[t]he difference between a prohibited punish-
ment and a permitted negative consequence is often very slight.”104 Thus, al-
lowing adverse inferences from silence exerts pressure on suspects to waive 
                                                        
94  Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986). 
95  Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules That En-
courage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 854 (2008). 
96  United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975). 
97  Id. at 176. 
98  Id. at 176–77. 
99  Aaron R. Pettit, Comment, Should the Prosecution Be Allowed to Comment on a Defend-
ant’s Pre-Arrest Silence in Its Case-in-Chief?, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181, 219 (1997). 
100  Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 499–500 (1967). 
101  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1. 
102  Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 160 (2001). 
103  Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 (1977). 
104  Craig Peyton Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth or Consequences: The Dilemma of 
Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceed-
ings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 545 (1997). 
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their privilege.105 This pressure is greater during the pretrial stage because the 
jury has no way of learning about the defendant’s pre-arrest silence without 
prosecutorial comment.106 The possibility of considering silence as part of the 
prosecution’s evidence is also inconsistent with the presumption of inno-
cence.107 Allowing incriminating conclusions based on silence is unwarranted 
as it is reminiscent of the perception of silence as an admission of guilt.108 It is 
unfair to grant the right to silence and in tandem assume that anyone who exer-
cises this right is guilty of a crime.109 The unfairness increases because “[t]he 
innocent are just as likely as the guilty to remain silent pretrial, yet the evidence 
damns all with a broad stroke.”110 
Innocent persons may remain silent for various reasons that have nothing 
to do with a desire to conceal guilt.111 Thus, silence may emanate from the will 
to preserve one’s privacy, to evade embarrassment, to protect one’s security, or 
to cover up for another person, and from mistrust of the police and a fear that 
the police will turn an exculpatory story into a sword against the suspect.112 Si-
lence may emanate from feelings of helplessness, confusion, tension, shock, 
                                                        
105  Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences Upon a Claim of Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1355, 1410 (1995) (regarding attorney–client privilege); 
Strauss, supra note 102, at 155–56. 
106  Strauss, supra note 102, at 156. 
107  ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN EVALUATIVE STUDY 112–13 (1994). 
108  Danny Ciracò, Reverse Engineering, 11 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 41, 59 
(2001). 
109  Id. 
110  Strauss, supra note 102, at 156–57. 
111  Marty Skrapka, Comment, Silence Should Be Golden: A Case Against the Use of a De-
fendant’s Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 399 
(2006); Pettit, supra note 99. 
112  United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975); Skrapka, supra note 111, at 359; see 
also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1964) (listing the 
policies and values protected by the right to silence). The Court explained that: 
The privilege against self-incrimination . . . reflects many of our fundamental values and 
most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel tri-
lemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an 
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicit-
ed by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual 
balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for 
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the 
entire load; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each in-
dividual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory 
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often 
a protection to the innocent. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 317 (McNaughton rev., 1961); 
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581–582 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), 
rev’d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957);Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955))(internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
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anger, insult, or misunderstanding.113 The Supreme Court has indeed recog-
nized that innocent persons may incriminate themselves through speaking, stat-
ing that “truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrong-
doer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the 
speaker’s own mouth.”114 The right to silence “serves as a protection to the in-
nocent as well as to the guilty.”115 An innocent person may incriminate himself, 
especially under circumstances of tension, due to contradictions that stem from 
memory weakness, confusion, excitement, and lack of concentration.116 Many 
times, persons may tend to describe events inaccurately. Since an innocent per-
son questioned by the police is often close to the incident under interrogation, 
her defense argument may be used to her detriment and bring about self-
incrimination. As Justices Marshall and Brennan opined: 
[I]n order for petitioner to offer his explanation of self-defense, he would neces-
sarily have had to admit that it was he who fatally stabbed the victim, thereby 
supplying against himself the strongest possible proof of an essential element of 
criminal homicide. It is hard to imagine a purer case of self-incrimination.117 
The right to silence may thus contribute to the defense of an innocent per-
son. Even an innocent person may utilize silence to escape conviction. 
Silence should be regarded as consistent with innocence, notwithstanding 
the time of its occurrence, whether pre- or post-delivery of Miranda warnings: 
“[W]e cannot assume that in the absence of official warnings individuals are 
ignorant of or oblivious to their constitutional rights . . . .”118 Since accused 
persons in both stages are equally exercising their constitutional rights, pre-
arrest silence is no more indicative of guilt than post-arrest silence. In fact, the 
Court’s aforementioned rationales for viewing post-arrest silence as consistent 
with innocence are equally applicable to silence during pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
interrogations. Chief Justice Burger’s observation in Hale is equally applicable 
to both stages: “It is no more accurate than to say, for example, that the inno-
cent rather than the guilty, are the first to protest their innocence. There is simp-
ly no basis for declaring a generalized probability one way or the other.”119 The 
Court resolved Hale on evidentiary, non-constitutional grounds, exercising its 
                                                        
113  Strauss, supra note 102, at 102; Maria Noelle Berger, Note, Defining the Scope of the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Should Prearrest Silence Be Admissible as Substantive 
Evidence of Guilt?, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1039; Skrapka, supra note 111, at 362–63, 
388. 
114  Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001). 
115  Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956) (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 
F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)). 
116  Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Respecting the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Call for 
Providing Miranda Warnings in Non-Custodial Interrogations, 42 N.M. L. REV. 203, 231–32 
(2012). 
117  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
118  Id. 
119  United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring). 
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supervisory powers over the federal courts.120 However, in the face of accusa-
tions, treating silence as an indication of guilt implicates constitutional law. 
The drawing of negative inferences from silence when disparity of power exists 
and when the stronger party levels accusations towards the weaker party vio-
lates the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment and the fairness guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
IV. REFUSAL TO SPEAK IN THE FACE OF ACCUSATIONS 
The privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit compelled testi-
mony. Thus, witnesses are commanded by law to give testimony in court.121 
The privilege against self-incrimination prohibits only compelled incriminating 
testimony. More accurately, given the court’s authority to compel a witness to 
incriminate himself under the shield of “use immunity,” the privilege only bars 
the use of incriminating evidence at trial under certain circumstances.122 
In Miranda, the Court held explicitly that the privilege was applicable to 
out-of-court custodial interrogations by law enforcement officers. In Jenkins, 
the Court declined to decide “whether or under what circumstances prearrest 
silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment.”123 However, Justice Ste-
vens, who concurred with the judgment, made clear that “[t]he fact that a citi-
zen has a constitutional right to remain silent when he is questioned has no 
bearing on the probative significance of his silence before he has any contact 
with the police.”124 Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment applies whenever a sus-
pect faces police questioning, even before being arrested or Mirandized. Simi-
larly, the Miranda Court did not limit the application of the privilege to custo-
dial interrogations, holding that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is available 
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all set-
tings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from 
being compelled to incriminate themselves.”125 
Additional Supreme Court rulings also indicate that the privilege against 
self-incrimination applies to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. The Court made 
clear that every risk of a criminal conviction triggers the Fifth Amendment. In 
so holding, the Court stated: 
                                                        
120  Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239 n.5. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Justices Marshall 
and Brennan, according to which, “the mere fact of prearrest silence is so unlikely to be pro-
bative of the falsity of the defendant’s trial testimony that its use for impeachment purposes 
is contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 246 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
121  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
122  Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 450 
(2002). 
123  Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2. 
124  Id. at 243. 
125  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
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The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Amendment not only pro-
tects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against him-
self in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official ques-
tions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.126 
A person who is not placed under arrest or read his Miranda rights is al-
lowed to refuse to answer official questions that might incriminate him in fu-
ture criminal proceedings under the protection of the self-incrimination privi-
lege.127 The privilege thus applies in out-of-court situations, whether the person 
is in custody or not.128 As Justice Kennedy opined in Chavez v. Martinez, 
[T]he Self-Incrimination Clause is a substantive constraint on the conduct of the 
government, not merely an evidentiary rule governing the work of the courts. 
The Clause must provide more than mere assurance that a compelled statement 
will not be introduced against its declarant in a criminal trial. . . . The Clause 
protects an individual from being forced to give answers demanded by an offi-
cial in any context when the answers might give rise to criminal liability in the 
future.129 
A suspect’s silence cannot be subjected to criminal punishment. The dan-
ger of self-incrimination is inherent in the very status of a person as an adver-
sary. The “cruel trilemma” rationale also applies in such circumstances.130 In 
civil proceedings, in administrative hearings, and in many criminal proceedings 
as well, a person is not under arrest. This fact alone does not lead to the loss of 
protection under the Fifth Amendment. 
The possibility of drawing adverse inferences from silence is a separate is-
sue from the existence or non-existence of a duty to provide information during 
police questioning or trial. Regarding trial, taking the stand might obviously 
heighten the probability of a defendant’s innocence in the eyes of the trier of 
fact, and no court may effectively forbid it.131 Furthermore, if the defendant 
leaves the prosecution’s case uncontested, he takes the risk that the trier of fact 
will accept the prosecution’s explanation at face value.132 But the Court in Grif-
fin held that “[w]hat the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one 
thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused 
                                                        
126  Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
127  Barbara Rook Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence in 
Criminal Trials, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 285, 337 (1988); Pettit, supra note 99, at 213. 
128  See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
129  Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 791 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
130  Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1115, 1137 (2008); Bentz, supra note 24, at 910; Michael R. Patrick, Note, Toward 
the Constitutional Protection of a Non-Testifying Defendant’s Prearrest Silence, 63 BROOK. 
L. REV. 897, 933 (1997); Pettit, supra note 99, at 218–19. 
131  Stein, supra note 130, at 1123, 1228. 
132  See Jeffrey Bellin, Reconceptualizing the Fifth Amendment Prohibition of Adverse 
Comment on Criminal Defendants’ Trial Silence, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 261 (2010). 
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into evidence against him is quite another.”133 Griffin notwithstanding, there is 
a disagreement among scholars as to the question of whether the defendant 
should be protected by right from judicial or prosecutorial comment on his si-
lence, as held in Griffin, and whether such comment constitutes a compulsion 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and an indirect penalty for the ex-
ercise of one’s Fifth Amendment rights.134 Some argue that drawing adverse 
inferences from silence does not constitute compulsion under the Fifth 
Amendment.135 Rendering the option to remain silent less attractive does not 
amount to compulsion.136 As Judge Friendly put it: “It requires a rather active 
imagination to analogize the judge’s refusal to comment, either way, on the ac-
cused’s failure to testify, to subjection to the thumbscrew or the rack.”137 
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, the Supreme Court held in a six-to-two majority 
that “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to 
civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence of-
fered against them.”138 The Court noted that drawing adverse inferences from 
silence in such a situation should not be regarded as a penalty on the exercise of 
the privilege.139 In the civil context, then, although the court may not compel 
self-incriminating testimony, it may draw adverse inferences from a party’s si-
lence. Permission to invoke the privilege to refuse to respond does not neces-
sarily imply that no adverse inferences from this refusal may be drawn. The 
Court in Baxter stressed the fact that “[t]he State has not, contrary to Griffin, 
sought to make evidentiary use of his silence at the disciplinary hearing in any 
criminal proceeding.”140 
As opposed to civil proceedings, the use of a criminal defendant’s silence 
at trial as evidence of guilt is prohibited.141 Drawing adverse inferences from 
pretrial, post-Miranda silence is also prohibited.142 Clearly, the rationale for the 
differentiation between civil and criminal proceedings cannot rest solely on the 
promise implicit in the warnings. If that were the reason for prohibiting adverse 
                                                        
133  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
134  For the distinction between direct and indirect penalty in the context of the Fifth 
Amendment, see Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial 
Balance, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1592–93 (1986). 
135  Office of Legal Policy, supra note 81, at 1078–79; Adam M. Stewart, The Silent Dom-
ino: Allowing Pre-Arrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt and the Possible Effect on Miranda, 
37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 189, 204 (2004). 
136  Office of Legal Policy, supra note 81, at 1095. 
137  Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 
929, 933 (1965). 
138  Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). 
139  Id. at 316–20. 
140  Id. at 317. 
141  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); see also supra text accompanying notes 
5–8. 
142  Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 295 (1986); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 
618 (1976); see also supra text accompanying notes 9–14. 
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inferences from post-Miranda silence, then the language of the warnings could 
simply be modified so that the suspect would also be informed of the possible 
negative consequences of his silence. Modifying the warnings accordingly 
would arguably enable the prosecution to use a defendant’s silence during cus-
todial interrogation as evidence of guilt.143 No issue of honoring a promise 
would be raised in such a scenario. Thus, for example, in England the suspect is 
put on notice that he has a right to remain silent but that exercising this right 
might strengthen the evidence against him.144 Drawing a distinction between 
the use of pre- and post-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt based on the lan-
guage of the warnings is therefore illogical and unjustifiable.145 Moreover, any 
reasonable person is already aware of his right to remain silent during a con-
frontation with the police, especially when under arrest, even before the official 
receipt of Miranda warnings. Thus, the bright-line test of pre- and post-
Miranda warnings in terms of the assurance embedded in the warnings is to a 
large extent artificial and may cause injustice to the accused person.146 
Since the criminal justice system effectively conveys to people that one has 
the right to remain silent in dealing with law enforcement agencies, the use at 
trial of pre-warning silence as evidence of guilt is just as unfair as the use of 
post-warning silence.147 Given widespread knowledge of Miranda, silence may 
reflect “a decision to invoke what even an innocent suspect believes to be an 
available and useful right of silence that may reduce the risk of wrongful prose-
cution or conviction.”148 Additionally, the police may eschew Miranda by 
simply delaying the arrest or the delivering of the warnings in the hope of ob-
                                                        
143  Office of Legal Policy, supra note 81, at 1014 (claiming, for support of the abolition of 
the right, that “[t]he most promising approach would be to argue that the restriction of Doyle 
v. Ohio does not apply if the defendant had been put on notice that his failure to talk could be 
used against him”); see also id. at 1106; Strauss, supra note 102, at 141–44 (supporting the 
exclusion of pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes). 
144  In England, the suspect is told: “You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your 
defense if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. 
Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” Kuk Cho, Reconstruction of the English 
Criminal Justice System and its Reinvigorated Exclusionary Rules, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 259, 285 (1999). 
145  Strauss, supra note 102, at 141–44. 
146  Bentz, supra note 24, at 932; Marc Scott Hennes, Note, Manipulating Miranda: United 
States v. Frazier and the Case-in-Chief Use of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1013, 1036–37 (2007); David E. Melson, Comment, Fourteenth Amend-
ment—Criminal Procedure: The Impeachment Use of Post-Arrest Silence Which Precedes 
the Receipt of Miranda Warnings, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1572, 1586–87 (1982); 
Pettit, supra note 99, at 217; Skrapka, supra note 111, at 358–59, 392; see also Salinas v. 
Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
147  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 23. 
148  Id. 
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taining incriminating statements or using the silence against the suspects later 
at trial.149 For police officers, it is a win-win situation. 
The rationales for not regarding a suspect’s silence during police question-
ing as evidence of guilt are considerable and material, not technical. In Salinas, 
the Court should have recognized, as did some of the circuit courts, that while 
Miranda warnings provide additional protection to defendants, the constitu-
tional right to remain silent as well as the rule against adverse inferences should 
not be dependent upon their delivery or the lack thereof.150 It is therefore not a 
mere matter of breaching a promise. Rather, it touches on the very status of a 
person as a suspect in the commission of a criminal offense. 
Some scholars claim that a person who is not under arrest is not subject to 
official compulsion to speak and therefore should not be entitled to any protec-
tion against compulsion.151 However, even non-custodial police interrogations 
may be coercive. Moreover, the compulsion to speak seems to be even more 
powerful during pre-custody questioning, as the suspect may still hope to se-
cure release if he can convince the officer of his innocence.152 Contrary to an 
arrest interrogation scenario, a suspect in a pre-arrest interview has the added 
threat of being arrested if he does not provide an exculpatory account.153 From 
a normative perspective, non-custodial suspects should also receive warnings of 
their rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.154 During po-
lice interrogation, law enforcement agencies may exercise pressure on suspects 
even if they are not held in custody. True, the suspect’s freedom of movement 
is not restricted. The suspect is, at least de jure, free to end the interrogation and 
walk away. However, when a person is suspected of committing a crime and 
becomes the subject of an interrogation, law enforcement agencies make efforts 
to secure his or her confession.155 Every interrogation of a suspect aimed at se-
curing a confession is a threatening situation that contains inherently compel-
ling pressures that might lead to self-incrimination.156 Thus, notifying a suspect 
                                                        
149  Berger, supra note 113, at 1043; Hennes, supra note 146, at 1015; Skrapka, supra note 
111, at 392; Vanessa Willis, Comment, The Government’s Use of Pre-Miranda Silence in Its 
Case-in-Chief: An Alternative Approach Under Schmerber v. California, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
741, 756–57 (2008). 
150  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that a prosecutor’s use of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence 
of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment); see also Savadjian, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
151  See, e.g., Romantz, supra note 44, at 51. 
152  Aurora Maoz, Note, Empty Promises: Miranda Warnings in Noncustodial Interrogations, 
110 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (2012). 
153  Id. at 1321. 
154  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116, at 218. 
155  Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New Justification for Demanding “Strong 
Corroboration” to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2791, 2815 (2007). 
156  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116, at 210. 
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that she is not under arrest and is free to end the interrogation whenever she 
wishes is not enough to protect her from being compelled to speak.157 
Police officers employ various tactics during interrogation in order to se-
cure a suspect’s confession. Most of these techniques may also be employed in 
non-custodial settings.158 Some interrogative tactics were “created for no pur-
pose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.”159 In a 
police-dominated atmosphere, such pressures may undermine the suspect’s free 
will.160 The non-custodial interrogation process, which obviously carries the 
threat of arrest and prosecution, “can be just as frightening and intimidating as 
a custodial interrogation.”161 Given the interrogation atmosphere, an innocent 
suspect may believe that the chances of avoiding a wrongful conviction would 
increase if he remains silent.162 During pressured non-custodial interrogations, 
innocent suspects may deem their protestations of innocence futile.163 Moreo-
ver, creating the false impression of overwhelming incriminating evidence may 
cause innocent persons to falsely confess guilt.164 
The mere threat of being arrested is highly intimidating and might paralyze 
the accused person. It is certainly not a situation that naturally calls for speak-
ing out.165 On the contrary, a person may believe that since he committed no 
crime, no explanation is needed, and his innocence would simply be re-
vealed.166 This proposition may be true even within personal relationships. 
Thus, suppose a person is accused by his friend of stealing his wallet. He might 
look at the friend angrily. Suppose the friend proceeds to say, “Yes, you did it. 
I have a lot of evidence against you.” Knowing for sure that he has not taken 
the wallet, the accused person might think to himself, “He is crazy; he is not 
worth my answer.”167 
Similarly, when a police officer asks an innocent person “if the ballistics 
from his shotgun were going to match the shotgun shells found at the apart-
ment,” that person might remain silent out of anger and surprise. Such a person 
                                                        
157  Id. at 206. 
158  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116, at 218; Pettit, supra note 99, at 216. 
159  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (regarding custodial interrogation envi-
ronment). 
160  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116; see also Pettit, supra note 99, at 216. 
161  Pettit, supra note 99, at 219. 
162  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116, at 232; Pettit, supra note 99, at 220. 
163  Strauss, supra note 102, at 145–46. 
164  Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrust-
worthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 128 (1997). 
165  Strauss, supra note 102, at 145. 
166  Id. at 146. 
167  This is contrary to Professor Greenawalt’s account. Greenawalt discusses a natural re-
sponse in the face of a friend’s accusations, which are based on strong evidence of wrongdo-
ing. R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 15, 20–26 (1981). 
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is not a civil adversary. Any reasonable person would understand that he is a 
suspect and that he is therefore in jeopardy of being detained, charged, and 
convicted. Even without employing coercive tactics of interrogation, the very 
risk that is inherent in police questioning creates an atmosphere of compul-
sion.168 
Notwithstanding the compulsion inherent in police questioning, the De-
partment of Justice opined that the reasons for protecting silence at trial (de-
spite the defendant’s right not to testify) are more compelling than the justifica-
tions for protecting silence at the pretrial stage because, unlike testimony at 
trial, giving a statement in the pretrial stage does not lead to negative conse-
quences such as a disclosure of criminal records or exposure to aggressive 
cross-examination.169 It seems, however, that the opposite is true. Some of the 
rationales that justify silence during interrogation lose their validity at the trial 
stage. Testimony in the courtroom is less vulnerable to misuse than testimony 
at the police station.170 Defendants at trial are not incommunicado. The trial is 
conducted publicly and is controlled by a judge. The judge does not interrogate 
the defendant. She does not impose undue pressure on him to confess.171 The 
defendant is normally represented by counsel throughout the trial. The defend-
ant is much better prepared for answering questions during cross-examination 
than for answering questions during police interrogation. He is, fully or partial-
ly, aware of the incriminating evidence against him, and is thus also aware that 
the prosecution is not attempting a fishing expedition. There are substantial 
quantitative and qualitative differences between the degrees of coercion at each 
of the stages.172 If silence at trial is protected from comments on failure to testi-
fy, then there is no reason not to extend the same protection to silence during 
police interrogation. The conclusion that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence should 
not be used as evidence of guilt may also be established on the implications of 
placing the burden of proof upon the state, implications to which this article 
now turns. 
V. BEARING THE BURDEN OF PROOF: THE ACCUSED PERSON’S  
RIGHT TO DEFY ACCUSATIONS BY SILENCE 
The state bears the burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt in order to 
secure a conviction.173 Actually, “[n]o principle in Anglo-American criminal 
law is more vaunted than the so-called ‘presumption of innocence’: the doctrine 
                                                        
168  See Bentz, supra note 24, at 928. 
169  Office of Legal Policy, supra note 81, at 1012. 
170  HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 231 (1996); Sanford 
Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 
637–38. 
171  Levinson, supra note 170. 
172  Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 309, 380 (1998). 
173  Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
15 NEV. L.J. 77 - KITAI-SANGERO & MERIN.DOCX 3/4/2015  3:01 PM 
Fall 2014] PROBING INTO SALINAS’S SILENCE 101 
that the prosecution must both produce evidence of guilt and persuade the fact-
finder ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”174 This heavy burden of proof has sound 
justifications.175 
In the early modern period, the common law trial employed the model of 
the “accused speaks.” This model was aimed at securing the defendant’s con-
fession, and did not allow the defendant’s representation by counsel.176 The 
“accused speaks” approach was also prevalent in America during the first cen-
tury of settlement.177 The trial was transformed to the model of “testing the 
prosecution” during the end of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth centu-
ry.178 Subsequently, the privilege against self-incrimination became a powerful 
tool for the defense counsel as part of the reordered modern criminal trial.179 As 
Langbein explains, “[o]nly when the modern ‘testing the prosecution’ theory of 
the criminal trial displaced the older ‘accused speaks’ theory did the criminal 
defendant acquire an effective right to decline to speak to the charges against 
him.”180 The right to be represented by counsel brought about the breakdown of 
the “accused speaks” model.181 The establishment of the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard of proof “encouraged defense counsel to silence the defendant 
and hence to insist that the prosecution case be built from other proofs.”182 Un-
der modern proceedings, then, the emphasis is placed on the strength of the 
prosecution’s case rather than on the reasonability of the accused’s response.183 
The accused does not need to prove her innocence, and has no obligation to 
provide information regarding the offense attributed to her either to the police 
or to the court. 
Indeed, the state must bear the burden of proof based on its own efforts and 
should obtain evidence independently of the accused person’s testimony.184 The 
Miranda Court held that “our accusatory system of criminal justice demands 
that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence 
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple ex-
pedient of compelling it from his own mouth.”185 The defendant is under no ob-
                                                        
174  Bruce P. Smith, The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750–1850, 23 
LAW & HIST. REV. 133, 133–34 (2005). 
175  See generally Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163 (2003). 
176  Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1092 (1994). 
177  Id. at 1091–92. 
178  John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at 
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1994). 
179  Id. 
180  Id. at 1066. 
181  Id. at 1069. 
182  Id. at 1070. 
183  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116, at 225. 
184  Strauss, supra note 102, at 158. 
185  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
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ligation to assist the prosecution in proving its case, and may remain passive 
during all stages of the criminal process. “But, if prosecutors can use silence in 
the face of accusatory questions as a sign of guilt, then the burden shifts to the 
suspect in making the government’s case and impairs the privilege.”186 
In criminal proceedings, the state accuses the individual of breaching the 
social compact.187 In such proceedings, the state creates a situation of conflict 
with the accused person. Accordingly, the accused person has a right to act as 
an adversary. Therefore, the state must fight its own battle, and it cannot force 
its adversary to cooperate in the same way that it cannot force a combatant of 
war to salute its flag.188 Acting as an adversary may be expressed in cutting off 
any contact with police officers who represent the state. The privilege should 
therefore be self-executing through silence.189 By silence the accused person 
declares that she views the state as an adversary. 
The same applies to the trial stage. In Jenkins v. Anderson, the Court em-
phasized that Jenkins “voluntarily took the witness stand in his own de-
fense,”190 and that “impeachment follows the defendant’s own decision to cast 
aside his cloak of silence.”191 Although the distinction between using silence 
for impeachment purposes and using silence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief 
encourages defendants not to testify in their defense, it can be justified. When 
the defendant decides to testify on his own behalf, it is legitimate to examine 
his credibility by, inter alia, questioning his decision to raise his current version 
for the first time.192 Accordingly, impeachment evidence “advances the truth-
finding function of the criminal trial.”193 Additionally, defendants who testify 
waive their privilege against self-incrimination regarding the offenses attributed 
to them.194 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has clarified that a defendant 
who testifies may be asked on cross-examination about prior silence in his first 
trial in order to impeach his credibility.195 But when the defendant does not take 
the stand in his own defense he conveys the following message: “I want the 
prosecution to prove its case completely detached from me. I do not offer my 
credibility. I simply claim that the prosecution does not have sufficient evi-
                                                        
186  Savadjian, supra note 8, at 42. 
187  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116, at 225. 
188  Michael S. Green, The Privilege’s Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 706–07 (1999). 
189  See Strauss, supra note 102, at 139 (citing Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 
1995)). 
190  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235 (1980). 
191  Id. at 238. 
192  See Strauss, supra note 102, at 120. 
193  Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238. 
194  Strauss, supra note 102, at 120. Strauss thinks, however, that this waiver should exclude 
pretrial Fifth Amendment rights because in the case of silence there is no contradiction of 
testimony. Id. at 159. 
195  Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926). 
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dence to obtain a conviction.” “Through silence, the accused person challenges 
the prosecution: ‘So prove your case, if you have any.’ ”196 Refusal to speak, 
then, is communicative.197 Using what a person did not say turns him into a 
communicative device to unwillingly supply evidence against himself.198 It is 
reminiscent of the “accused speaks” model rather than “testing the prosecution” 
model which replaced it. 
The defendant is entitled to plan her defense strategy not by positively in-
troducing her own version, but rather by pointing to the weaknesses and flaws 
in the prosecution’s case. Defendants have a right to remain silent in the hope 
that the prosecution will fail to meet the burden of proof that is required for 
conviction.199 The prosecution’s knowledge that it cannot necessarily rely on 
the defense’s weaknesses and flaws also incentivizes it to establish its case on 
compelling evidence. 
The Latin maxim “nemo tenetur prodere seipsum” (no man is bound to ac-
cuse himself), which was recognized by ius commune in the sixteenth centu-
ry,200 had carried only limited implications in light of its exceptions: it was ex-
cluded “where there was public knowledge that a crime had been committed, 
where the public had an interest in punishing the crime, and where there were 
legitimate indicia that the defendant being questioned had committed it.”201 De-
spite its broad exceptions, it had a value: “the rule nemo tenetur prodere seip-
sum still applied in the absence of public notoriety indicating that an accused 
had committed a crime, and it still applied to prohibit judicial fishing expedi-
tions to search out defendants’ private faults.”202 The rule recognized the ac-
cused person’s right against being made the object of a charge in the absence of 
substantial indications of guilt. 
Salinas would have been protected from the duty to speak even under the 
narrow protection of the ius commune. The police officer who asked the match 
question did not present to Salinas even prima facie evidence regarding his 
guilt. This is usually the case in criminal interrogations: the interrogators do not 
systematically reveal the incriminating evidence they possess against the sus-
pect and do not allow him the opportunity to coherently refute the evidence 
against him.203 Moreover, when a suspect is not under arrest, no probable cause 
                                                        
196  Kitai-Sangero, supra note 116, at 224. 
197  Bentz, supra note 24, at 931; Willis, supra note 149, at 753–54. 
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is required, and there is therefore less reason to require her to answer police 
questions.204 
Additionally, there is a close connection between the pretrial and the crim-
inal trial stages.205 Thus, colonial criminal procedure had put an emphasis on 
the pretrial stage, “and it was in pretrial proceedings that the full weight of the 
criminal process was enlisted behind the attempt to induce self-
incrimination.”206 The conduct of the investigation may dictate the result of the 
trial. As Langbein notes, “[t]hen as now, pretrial dominated trial.”207 Compel-
ling a person to speak during the investigation stage may render his silence at 
trial superfluous as a shield against the charges. Similarly, if adverse inferences 
may be drawn against the defendant from his pretrial silence then he would 
have to testify at trial and explain his pretrial silence in order to expel the con-
clusion of guilt. Allowing the use of pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt 
“would favor the state in its competition against the individual. If a defendant 
knows that her prearrest silence may be used against her at trial, she is more 
likely to speak with the police earlier.”208 Substantive use of pre-arrest silence 
therefore places substantial pressure upon the defendant to waive his privilege 
against self-incrimination in order to explain his silence either during police 
questioning or at trial.209 Creating incentives to speak conveys a message re-
garding the desirability of speaking. This message has no room under the “test-
ing the prosecution” model, which ought to place the emphasis upon the prose-
cution’s obligation to come forward with evidence sufficient for a conviction, 
and not upon the accused person, who may defend himself by silence. 
CONCLUSION 
Levy emphasizes that the right against self-incrimination is “a right to re-
fuse to answer, not a right to be immune from questioning or exposure to in-
crimination.”210 Internalization of this insight should lead to the conclusion that 
the right to silence during police questioning is self-executing, and that its ex-
ercise should draw no adverse inferences. 
                                                        
204  Bentz, supra note 24, at 915. 
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Using pretrial silence against non-testifying defendants as substantial proof 
of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment. The status of a person as a criminal sus-
pect grants her the right to silence. No person should be forced to supply law 
enforcement authorities with proof of his guilt in the face of accusations. 
Moreover, given the various reasons and justifications for remaining silent, 
standing mute in the face of accusations does not indicate guilt. Levy con-
cludes: 
[T]he right became neither a privilege of the guilty nor a protection of the inno-
cent. It became merely one of the ways of fairly determining guilt or innocence, 
like trial by jury itself . . . . Forcing self-incrimination was thought not only to 
brutalize the system of criminal justice but to produce weak and untrustworthy 
evidence.211 
The understanding that silence is not inimical to the search for truth is a far 
cry from Bentham’s view. This evidentiary insight becomes a constitutional in-
sight when a person becomes a suspect of committing a crime. 
No one can envision what his reaction would be in the face of accusations. 
False accusations may spark unexpected reactions. It is very difficult to gauge 
whether response or silence on the part of the accused person should be ex-
pected. Every person, whether innocent or guilty, wishes to avoid self-
destruction. A desire to avoid prosecution and conviction is common to both 
the guilty and the innocent. The innocent, too, may be led toward silence by the 
instinct of self-preservation. The primary goal of the Fifth Amendment should 
be the protection of the innocent rather than providing shelter to the guilty. 
In a situation of conflict between the state and the individual that involves 
accusations leveled against the individual, the state bears the burden of proof, 
and it should carry it without any assistance on the part of the accused. Refrain-
ing from taking the witness stand at trial or refusing to answer a police officer’s 
questions implies a statement that the state should shoulder the burden of proof 
by relying solely on the prosecution’s case. Choosing silence emphasizes the 
accused person’s will to put the emphasis on the prosecution’s duty to gather its 
own evidence. Silence is a means of defense, not of proof. Silence is not a piece 
of evidence. It should be a shield against a conviction, and not a sword used by 
the state against the individual. 
We conclude with an optimistic note, which sees the glass half full. Since 
the Court in Salinas held that non-custodial suspects are required to explicitly 
invoke the privilege, there is reason to hope that, at least in cases of such invo-
cations, adverse inferences against non-testifying defendants would not be al-
lowed. Such a rule would make clear that no one could be required to be his or 
her own accuser in a situation of conflict with the state, at least in cases where 
the accused person explicitly asserts this rivalry. Notwithstanding, this rivalry 
is discernible from the very accusations leveled by the state against the accused 
person. 
                                                        
211  Levy, supra note 3, at 332. 
